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Abstract. Temporary blockchain forks are part of the regular consen-
sus process in permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin. As forks can
be caused by numerous factors such as latency and miner behavior,
their analysis provides insights into these factors, which are otherwise
unknown. In this paper we provide an empirical analysis of the an-
nouncement and propagation of blocks that led to forks of the Bitcoin
blockchain. By analyzing the time differences in the publication of com-
peting blocks, we show that the block propagation delay between miners
can be of similar order as the block propagation delay of the average
Bitcoin peer. Furthermore, we show that the probability of a block to
become part of the main chain increases roughly linearly in the time
the block has been published before the competing block. Additionally,
we show that the observed frequency of short block intervals between
two consecutive blocks mined by the same miner after a fork is conspic-
uously large. While selfish mining can be a cause for this observation,
other causes are also possible. Finally, we show that not only the time dif-
ference of the publication of competing blocks but also their propagation
speeds vary greatly.
1 Introduction
Blockchain forks, which occur when two miners independently find and publish
a new block referencing the same previous block, occur regularly in permission-
less blockchains such as Bitcoin [7]. As subsequent blocks resolve the temporary
inconsistency, forks are part of a blockchain’s normal operation. While the ex-
istence of delay between miners inevitably leads to blockchain forks, deviating
mining strategies such as selfish mining [3] can also lead to forks. Recent dis-
cussions on block size, the feasibility of selfish mining (negative gamma), and
speculations on the network topology between miners are all related to factors
affecting the security of permissionless blockchains [5]. As forks are affected by
many of these factors, the analysis of forks that actually took place may help to
improve the understanding of these factors.
Based on measurements of the Bitcoin peer-to-peer (P2P) network since 2015
we analyze the announcement and propagation of blocks that led to blockchain
forks. Specifically, we compare the time differences between the first announce-
ment of competing blocks to the average block propagation delay. Furthermore,
we analyze the effect of a headstart of one block over competing blocks (i.e., how
much earlier a block was published) on the block’s probability to become part
of the main chain. In order to assess whether deviating mining strategies were
performed, we analyze the block intervals immediately after blockchain forks.
Finally, we study the differences in the propagation of blocks of four selected
forks through the Bitcoin P2P network.
2 Fundamentals & Related Work
We will now briefly sketch the relevant aspects of mining and block propagation
in Bitcoin. A thorough introduction can be found in, e.g., [8]. Bitcoin blocks are
generated in the process of mining by aggregating a set of previously published
transactions into a block and solving a proof-of-work puzzle for that block. Each
block contains the hash value of the previous block, which creates a chain of
blocks. Miners are expected to work on top of the longest valid blockchain known
to them, i.e., when a miner receives a new block extending the current blockchain,
the miner should update the block she is working on by changing the reference
to the newly received block.
A blockchain fork occurs if two new blocks that reference the same previous
block are independently found at the same time by different miners. Because solv-
ing the proof-of-work puzzle is a random process and block propagation between
miners is subject to network and processing delays, such forks occur regularly.
However, forks can also be the result of selfish mining [3], a mining strategy in
which a miner withholds new blocks instead of immediately publishing them in
order to gain an advantage in finding the next block. Another strategy that can
create blockchain forks is the fork after withholding attack [6].
Propagation of new blocks and transactions is performed by flooding via
the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network, and by transmission via additional, possibly
private networks (e.g., the Fibre network) [2]. Several characterizations of the
Bitcoin P2P network have been published in the past [1,4]. Furthermore, there
are several websites that publish statistics such as block propagation delays, i.e.,
the time it takes blocks to propagate through a certain share of the network.1
3 Measurement and Analysis Method
Since 2015 we have operated two monitor nodes that establish connections to
all reachable peers of the Bitcoin P2P network. The number of connections
varied between around 6,000 and 14,000 in the considered period. The monitor
nodes stay mostly passive (except for establishing connections and sending and
answering PING messages) and log the announcement of new transactions and
blocks via inventory messages (INV ) by remote peers. Therefore, our dataset
contains tuples consisting of (time, hash value, IP address). From this data the
1 E.g., https://blockchain.info, https://bitnodes.earn.com, http:
//bitcoinstats.com/network/propagation, https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/bitcoin
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Fig. 1. Time difference between the first announcement of forking blocks. A green
cross (positive Diff ) indicates that the block that was announced first became part of
the main chain, a red cross (negative Diff ) indicates that the later announced block
became part of the main chain. Boxes around blocks indicate that the subsequent block
has been mined by the same miner; additional circles around blocks indicate that the
subsequent block has been mined by the same miner within less than 100 seconds.
Finally, the average 50 % block propagation percentile is shown.
timestamp of the first announcement of a block can be derived. Furthermore,
the propagation speed of a block (i.e., how many announcements were received
within a certain time) can be derived.
As our monitor nodes do not actually request blocks from remote peers, our
dataset does not contain the block headers and does not indicate whether forks
happened. Therefore, we combine our data with data published by blockchain.info
that contains further information on each block hash, such as the reference to
the previous block, whether the block became part of the main chain, and the
miner as indicated in the coinbase transaction (set by the miner). All data used
in this paper can be accessed at https://dsn.tm.kit.edu/bitcoin/forks.
4 Analysis of Bitcoin Blockchain Forks
As a first step, we analyze the time differences between the first announcements
of the competing blocks that cause a fork. If all miners follow the protocol and
immediately start working on top of any new valid block they receive, these
time differences should not be larger than the block propagation delay between
miners. Fig. 1 shows all forks between October 2015 and March 2018 that we
have data on, and the time difference between the first announcements of both
blocks of each fork: every cross indicates one fork, i.e., one blockchain height
at which two blocks have been announced. A green cross indicates that the
block that has been announced first became part of the main chain, a red cross
indicates that the later announced block became part of the main chain.
The data confirms that the fork rate decreased substantially in the past years.
Additionally, the observed announcement time differences decreased from sev-
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Fig. 2. Probability (moving average, binsize = 50 ms) of a forking block becoming part
of the main chain depending on the headstart over the competing block.
eral seconds in late 2015 to less then two seconds since mid 2017. Fig. 1 also
shows the measured average 50 % block propagation percentile, i.e., the time
difference between the first announcement of a block and the time the block
has been announced by 50 % of all peers. While we expect mining pools to be
better connected to the Bitcoin P2P network than the average peer, the 50 %
block propagation percentile gives an idea of the latency between peers. The de-
creased block propagation delay also reflects the improvements made to the block
propagation mechanism of Bitcoin. The comparison of the announcement time
difference to the block propagation delay shows that the announcement time dif-
ference of almost all forks is smaller than the 50 % block propagation percentile.
However, some announcement time differences are still strikingly large, and a
few are even larger than the 50 % block propagation percentile.
Assuming that all miners always mine on top of the longest blockchain they
received, the data indicates that the block propagation delay between miners
that caused forks was not substantially lower than the block propagation delay
of average Bitcoin peers. While this might be surprising, we emphasize that the
observed announcement delays might be caused by single miners that temporar-
ily suffer from a high link latency, i.e., they represent worst cases, whereas the
shown 50 % block propagation percentile represents an average case.
Several questions arise from the discussion of the data shown in Fig. 1. First,
while the block that is announced first is regularly included in the main chain,
the effect of the headstart of one block over another block on the probability to
become included in the main chain is unclear. Secondly, the data is not sufficient
to assess whether miners deviate from the mining strategy, e.g., by selfish min-
ing. Finally, the effect of the P2P propagation speed of forking blocks remains
unclear. We will address all three questions in the remainder of this section.
4.1 Effect of Headstart on Probability of Main Chain Inclusion
In order to analyze the relationship between the headstart of a block (i.e., the
time difference the block has been announced before the competing block) and
the probability that this block becomes part of the main chain, we look at the
block that was announced first and check whether this block became part of
the main chain. Hence, each fork can be represented by a tuple (headstart,
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Fig. 3. Histogram of the interval to the next block after the fork. Post Fork Intervals
- Same miner: only intervals where the subsequent block has been mined by the same
miner as the previous block. Post Fork Intervals - Different miner: only intervals where
the subsequent block has been mined by a different miner as the previous block. All
Intervals: All block intervals since block 350,000. Exponential Distribution: Idealized
block interval.
i ∈ {1, 0}). By sorting all tuples by the headstart, a moving average of the
probability of main chain inclusion can be calculated. Fig. 2 shows the moving
average of the probability of a block becoming part of the main chain depending
on the headstart over the competing block. At the borders of the plot, the
moving average window is reduced symmetrically, hence, the variance of the
plot increases in these areas. Although the sample size of the data is small, a
general trend can be seen, especially between 100 ms and 10 s. For this interval,
Fig. 2 also shows a linear trend line (y = 3.07 · 10−5x+ 0.63).
The data shows that a headstart of 100 ms results in a probability of main
chain inclusion of around 70 %. After a short drop at a headstart of around
500 ms, the probability increases to more than 80 % for a headstart of 10 sec-
onds. We emphasize that the data is dominated by the large number of forks
until around mid 2017. It is likely that due to the reduced block propagation
delay, today a smaller headstart leads to a much larger probability of main chain
inclusion.
4.2 Deviating Mining Strategy
Consider a miner following the selfish mining strategy that withholds two blocks
and receives a competing block for her first block withheld. In that case the
selfish miner would publish both withheld blocks within a a short period of time
in order to prevent the competing block from becoming included in the main
chain, rendering the withheld blocks useless. Hence, very small block intervals
after the occurrence of a fork can be caused by selfish mining. We will now
analyze the block intervals after forks.
For all forks, we calculate the block interval between the first announcement
of the block that got included in the main chain and the first announcement
of the subsequent block (i.e., the block at the next height). We split all forks
we have data about into two groups: Group Same Miner contains all 37 forks
where the block that got included in the main chain and the subsequent block
has both been mined by the same miner (also shown in Fig. 1 as rectangles).
Group Different Miner contains all 194 forks where both blocks were mined
by different miners. Please note that the miner attribution is done based on
information embedded by the miner in the block, which can be freely set by the
miner. For comparison, we also calculate all block intervals since block 350,000.
Fig. 3 shows histograms of the block interval for the groups Same Miner and
Different Miner along with all block intervals and an idealized block interval dis-
tribution modeled by an exponential distribution. While the relative frequencies
of all groups correspond well for larger block intervals, major differences can be
observed for the smallest interval (< 100 s): Out of the 37 forks with the same
miner, 11 forks (30 %) had a block interval of less than 100 seconds between the
fork and the subsequent block. Contrary, only 23 forks of the 194 forks with dif-
ferent miners had a block interval of less than 100 seconds (12 %). The expected
relative frequency is in the order of 14 % (measured) or 15 % (idealized).
We will now discuss possible reasons for the observed deviation. First, al-
though a validation of our measurements with other data shows a high corre-
spondence, we cannot completely rule out measurement errors. Secondly, the
probability that 11 or more samples out of 37 samples of the idealized block
interval distribution are smaller than 100 s is around 2 %. Therefore, while the
observation seems unlikely, there is a substantial probability that the observation
is simply the result of the random mining process and the small sample size.
Thirdly, the presence of block propagation delays makes the considered events
statistically dependent. For instance, if a block interval is smaller than the block
propagation delay, the subsequent block is definitely mined by the same miner,
as other miners did not receive the previous block yet. However, the peculiar
relative frequency shown in Fig. 3 corresponds to the conditional probability of
observing a small block interval given that a fork occurred and both blocks were
mined by the same miner. The existence of a fork is independent of the next
block interval, as the mining power remains constant (although split). However,
the block propagation delay gives the miner of the last block an advantage
in finding the subsequent block, until other miners have received the block.
Therefore, during block propagation, the overall mining power is reduced to
the mining power of the miners that have already received the block. Hence,
the overall block interval should actually increase (minimally) compared to the
idealized block interval as modeled by an exponential distribution. Furthermore,
all observed block intervals in the Same Miner group are at least 40 seconds,
hence block propagation delay should not affect the interval, as the advantage
of the miner vanishes as soon as other miners receive a block.
Finally, selfish mining could be the cause for the observed block intervals.
Blocks of 9 of the 11 forks with block intervals below 100 seconds were mined
by only two different mining pools, which had a share of the network hash rate
of around 20 % and 10 %, respectively, at the time. Hence a single mining pool
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Fig. 4. Block propagation for both blocks (Main chain, Orphaned) for selected forks.
following the selfish mining strategy could have caused the observed deviations.
However, the fact that all observed block intervals were at least 40 seconds raises
doubts that selfish mining was actually performed, because one would expect
miners to immediately publish the subsequent block. Furthermore, one would
not expect a selfish miner to voluntarily include information about its identity
in a mined block. Finally, the mining power shares of the pools render selfish
mining only lucrative when assuming a significant network advantage γ [3].
Although all discussed possible causes for the observed block intervals seem
unlikely, the presented data provides insights into a specific aspect of the mining
process and can serve as a starting point for further research.
4.3 Peer-to-Peer Propagation Comparison
The differences in the time a block has been announced shown in Fig. 1 only
show that a block has not been received by a miner within this time difference,
but do not give reasons for why the block has not reached the other miner. Fig. 4
shows the P2P propagation of the blocks that caused four different selected forks.
The fork at height 497373 (top left) shows the standard case: The main chain
block is propagated slightly before the orphaned block, which is announced only
by those peers that have not already received the main chain block. In contrast,
in the fork at height 472040 (top right) the orphaned block is propagated first,
however, it propagates very slowly. More than one second later, the included
block is propagated at a similar propagation speed. In the fork at height 473586
(bottom left) the main chain block is propagated first, but is only announced by
less than 100 peers within 10 seconds. Contrary, the orphaned block is published
one second later, but propagates very fast through the network. Finally, the
main chain block at height 473064 (bottom right) is published more than a
second after the well propagated orphaned block, but still it became part of the
main chain.
The examples show that not only the first announcement of a block plays a
role in which block becomes part of the main chain, but also the propagation
speed of each block. However, as all combinations of headstart (positive vs. neg-
ative) and propagation speed (slow vs. fast) could be observed, P2P propagation
of blocks does not seem to be the main decisive factor in which block becomes
part of the main chain. A possible reason for slow propagation speeds could be
extremely long validation times for these blocks. For instance, if a block contains
a transaction on which other transactions that are contained in a peer’s mempool
depend, the peer also has to validate and order these transactions. Additionally,
the examples show that the propagation of each block can differ drastically,
hence a purely statistical model of block propagation can be insufficient.
5 Conclusions & Future Work
We provided an empirical analysis of the announcement and propagation of
Bitcoin blocks that caused blockchain forks. The large differences in the first
announcements of competing blocks indicate that the block propagation delay
between miners can be of similar order as the observed 50 % block propagation
percentile. The probability of a block to become part of the main chain increases
linearly in the headstart (i.e., the time the block has been published before the
competing block) between 100 ms and 10 s (from less than 70 % to more than
80 %). The observed frequency of block intervals between two consecutive blocks
mined by the same miner to be less than 100 seconds is conspicuously large.
While selfish mining can be a cause for this observation, other causes are also
possible.
A better understanding of the factors influencing the propagation speed of
specific blocks might be gained by an in-depth analysis of (orphaned) blocks and
client implementations. Furthermore, our analysis might profit from more data,
especially on recent forks. While the reduced frequency of forks is generally good
for the system, it is unfortunate for empirical research.
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